IT is only on the hypothesis of the unconscious perversion of judicial reason by party prejudice that we can explain the fact that the selection of the jury in O’Connell’s case was sustained not only by a majority of the Irish court, but by such capable judges as Lords Lyndhurst* and Brougham* in the House of Lords.
In voting to reverse on this ground, Lords Denman, Cottenham,* and Campbell* not only obeyed a sound judicial instinct, but inflicted a fatal blow on the infamous usage, till then prevalent in Ireland, of cooking up, by irresponsible parties outside of the sheriff’s office, juries to suit particular cases. It became, therefore, settled that a challenge to array would lie in all cases in which the selection of the jury, whatever might be the agency of wrong, was not absolutely fair.
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* John Singleton Copley (1772-1863), 1st Baron Lyndhurst, served as Lord High Chancellor three times, in 1827-1830, 1834-1835 (from November 1834, not during the trial), and 1841-1846.
* Henry Peter Brougham (1778-1868), 1st Baron Brougham and Vaux, who served as Lord High Chancellor in 1830-1834, and was in post during the trial of Daniel O’Connell.
* Charles Christopher Pepys (1781-1851), 1st Earl of Cottenham, was twice Lord High Chancellor, in 1836-1841 and 1846-1850. In this case, Pepys is pronounced PE-pis.
* John Campbell (1779-1861), 1st Baron Campbell, a former Attorney General (1835-1841) and briefly Lord High Chancellor of Ireland (June 1841) who later served as Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench (1846-1850) and Lord High Chancellor (1850-1859).